不完全信息静态博弈

产品验收中的不完全信息静态博弈

Static game of insufficient information in sampling inspection for product delivery

方法采用不完全信息静态博弈。

Methods The static game theory under incomplete information and numerical example .

经理流动的不完全信息静态博弈主要分析在信任和人力资本特征方面的权衡；

Static game model focuses on the characteristics of credit and human resources with incomplete information ;

结合实际的供应链非合作博弈案例，用不完全信息静态博弈理论建立了零售商与供应商的出价&购买模型，分析了现代商业竞争中的店大欺厂现象并给出了相应对策；

And analyzes the priority of retailer in modern commercial competition with incomplete information static game model .

首先概述了博弈论的概念、分类以及其中的不完全信息静态博弈。

This paper summarizes the game theory 's concept , sort and static game of incomplete information .

运用博弈论中不完全信息静态博弈理论，对电信普遍服务基金分配机制进行了研究。

Using the incomplete information static game theory , the telecom universal service fund allocation mechanism was studied .

在绿色建筑承包商不完全信息静态博弈分析中，提出绿色建筑承包商选择机制。

From the static weighting analysis of incomplete information of contractors of Green building , the selective mechanism was put forward .

在房地产开发企业向商业银行申请贷款时，由于信息的不对称而产生了两者之间的不完全信息静态博弈。

When real estate development companies apply for loans from commercial banks , it is an incomplete information static game between the two parties due to asymmetric information .

对上述问题的具体背景，运用不完全信息静态博弈模型进行分析，给出贝叶斯均衡，并以算例说明贝叶斯均衡的具体确定过程，得出相关结论。

Static game model of insufficient information is applied to analyze the above selection . Using number example bayes equlibrium is given and the relative conclusions are presented .

通过建立环境监管问题的不完全信息静态博弈模型，证明了在适宜的制度环境条件下，合谋可能是企业与地方政府的最优选择。

This chapter constitutes a static game model of incomplete information in environment supervision , and identifies that coalition should be the first-best selection when institutional environment was suitable .

本文主要讨论了两个企业关于赞助活动的不完全信息静态博弈模型及其均衡，并与完全信息静态的情况做了比较。

This paper mainly discusses two enterprises in incomplete information static state game model concerning sponsoring activities and it 's equilibrium , and compared with complete information static state of circumstance .

从风险与安全的角度提出一种新的用户行为决策模型，将服务提供者和用户作为非合作博弈的对立方，在不完全信息静态博弈的基础上研究博弈参与者之间的交互行为。

The service provider and the user are regarded as the two players in the non-cooperation games , and their interactions are analyzed based on static games model with incomplete information .

基于一级密封价格拍卖方式，建立了排污权交易制度中初始排污权分配的不完全信息静态博弈模型。

A static game model with incomplete information based on the first price sealed auction is established , which is used for selling initial permits by auction in the tradable emission permits system .

招投标活动符合不完全信息静态博弈条件，本文基于经评审的最低投标价法的评标办法进行了投标报价的博弈分析。

A gaming analysis to quote is analyzed based on " the minimum price law of bidding evaluation ", and an optimum bid quotation for bidder is given out by seeking the balance of Bayes Nash of gaming condition .

最后运用因子分析和聚类分析法对西北主要城市金融集聚力进行研究，在此基础上结合不完全信息静态博弈模型，提出建设西北区域金融中心的合理建议。

Finally , we use factor analysis and cluster analysis of the major cities in the Northwest to study financial competitiveness . on this basis , combined with incomplete information static game model , I proposed the building of the regional financial center in the Northwest and reasonable proposal .

借鉴目标管理的思想、考察效绩目标的特性，并运用问题分析的方法，剖析了省级电网企业财务目标确定的思路；运用不完全信息静态博弈理论分析了经营者业绩目标确定的过程；

With the reference on the idea of management by objectives and trait of performance target , the determination of financial goal was analyzed by using the method of problem analysis , and the determination of managers ' performance objects was also analyzed by using game theory with incomplete information .

根据工程招投标特点，构建出不完全信息静态投标博弈模型。

According to the characteristics of project bid , a static game model of incomplete information was developed .

摘要通过设计一个理想的不完全信息静态的税收博弈模型可以推导出，博弈最终均衡解的取得依赖于政府选择的税收制度是否最优，因而我国进行第三次税制改革势在必行。

Through design ideal imperfect information static tax gaming model , we can find out that ultimate equilibrium solution depends on the governmental selection of tax system , thus the third tax system reform of China must be done .

通过股权制衡的完全信息和不完全信息的静态、动态博弈分析，研究公司治理中控股股东和非控股股东的行为关系。

This paper first analyzes the behavior of the controlling and non-controlling shareholders by static and dynamic game with the complete and incomplete information .