相机抉择货币政策

规则与相机抉择货币政策我国应用的实证研究

Research on the Building of Rules and Discretion Monetary Policy in China

在完全信息下，静态（单期）博弈时，相机抉择货币政策正由于动态非一致问题而劣于规则货币政策；

In the case of complete information , if it is static game , discretion is inferior to rules because of the " dynamic inconsistence ";

首先，究竟应该采用规则还是相机抉择的货币政策呢？

First , the question is that should rules or discretion in monetary policy be carried out ?

20世纪70年代，动态不一致理论的提出使人们逐渐认识到相机抉择的货币政策易引起时间不一致性问题和通货膨胀倾向。

Since 1970s , after the theory of dynamic inconsistency being put forward , people began to realize the problem of time inconsistency in monetary policy and inflation bais .

20世纪90年代后，西方学者和政策制定者开始逐步放弃相机抉择的货币政策调控思想，转而主张实施规则性货币政策。

After 90 years of the 20th century , Western scholars and policy makers began to gradually give up the discretionary monetary policy thinking , instead advocating the implementation of monetary policy rules .

20世纪70年代初期布雷顿森林体系崩溃以后，世界各国的中央银行所承担的责任越来越复杂，相机抉择的货币政策暴露出越来越多的弊端。

After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in early 1970s , The responsibilities of central banks around the world become more complicated . The reality shows that discretion has much more flaws .

总体而言，这种相机抉择的货币政策调控的频率越来越高，货币政策效果却不断降低，不仅扩大了经济波动的频率与幅度，而且由此引致的经济福利损失也在增大。

But overall , this " discretionary " monetary policy implementation is using frequency , effects of monetary policy has become more and more unstable , not only expanded the frequency and magnitude of economic fluctuations , but also the loss of economic welfare is increased .