地方性广告

研究发现，在斯坦伯格博弈下，零售商之间的广告竞争越激烈，零售商投入地方性广告越多。

The results show that the more the intensity of advertising competition between the two downstream retailers , the more the retailers advertise on local advertising in Stackelberg game .

在第四章中，讨论了一个销售通道中N+1个成员在品牌投资、地方性广告支出和广告费用以及费用共享规则上进行合作时的问题。

In Chapter 4 consider the problem in a channel with a single manufacturer and N retailers through brand image , local advertising expenditures , and sharing rules of advertising expenses .

同时，斯坦博格和合作博弈下零售商的地方性广告投入和制造商的商誉与零售商之间的广告竞争强度相关。

Meanwhile , the relationships of the local advertising and the goodwill of the manufacturer between in Stackelberg game and cooperative game rely on intensity of advertising competition between the two downstream retailers .

研究结果表明：（1）如果生产商分摊零售商地方性广告成本的意愿越强，零售商就越愿意投入更多的资金到地方性广告，使增加的销量越大。

The conclusions are shown as follows : ( 1 ) If the manufacturer is more willing to share the local advertising cost , the retailer is willing to invest more in local advertising to promote sales .

在前人研究的基础上，首次将零售商的全国性广告及其在竞争环境下的溢出效应引入模型，并探索性地对地方性广告效果进行非线性化处理，使之更贴近实际。

Based on research results before , we introduce the national advertising investment of retailer and spillover effects of the national advertising into the model at the first time . In order to close to the actual situation , we process the effect of local advertising by nonlinear method .

研究表明，Nash合作博弈均衡时的订货数量、存货水平、全国性（或地方性）广告水平、渠道成员各自期望利润以及系统期望利润都要大于Stackelberg主从博弈均衡时的相应值。

The results show that , ordering quantities , the stocking level , the national or local advertising rate , the respective expected profits of channel members , and the system expected profits at Nash co-op equilibrium are higher than those at Stackelberg equilibrium .