契约经济学

在对企业发展分析中，利用资本结构理论中的M-M理论和契约经济学的委托-代理理论，讨论了资本流动证券化在减少各种交易成本、激励企业内在增长动力上的作用。

Enterprise development . Under the guideline of M-M theorem for capital structure theory and principal-agent theory of contract economics , the paper illustrates the effect of securitization in Chinese economic growth on deducting transaction cost and spurring the management internal motives and specially focuses on the entrepreneur spirit .

从组织理论到契约经济学：文献综述

From Organization Theory to Contract Economics : A Survey

医疗保险制度改革的契约经济学分析

Analysis of Contract Economic in Reform of Medical Insurance System

从契约经济学的角度谈审计关系

On Audit Relationship from the Aspect of Contract Economics

本文运用契约经济学的分析框架研究了科研合同的契约性质。

This paper discusses the nature of scientific research contract based on contract economics .

秩序演变与中国农村改革&一个基于契约经济学的分析

The Order Evolution and China 's Rural Reforming : An Analysis Based on Contract Economics

契约经济学分析框架。

An analytical framework of contract economics .

关于转型期农地制度改革的若干思考&一个契约经济学的视角

On the Reform of Rural Land System in Transition Period & A View of Contractual Economics

现代契约经济学的研究是从一整套概念、范畴和分析方法开始的。

Modern contact economics begin from a complete set of concept , category and the method of analysis .

文章从契约经济学的相关理论，特别是委托&代理理论的原理出发，对审计的三方面关系进行了分析。

This paper analyzes three aspects of audit from the related theories such as contract economics , especially trust-agent theory .

文章分析认为，当今关于组织理论的前沿研究已从传统的组织理论上升为契约经济学。

The analysis considers that advancing front studies of organization theory has ascended from conventional organization theory to contractual economics .

可以说，风险投资领域是考察契约经济学基本原理的最佳实验场之一。

In another word , venture capital investment is the best experiment to explain the basic principles of contract economics .

本文利用现代契约经济学基本理论，对同一技术条件下、由技术使用者替代性投入行为而产生的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。

Making use of contract theory , this paper analyzes several price contracts for the moral hazard problem in technological licensing .

通过对科研合同的契约经济学分析，指出了科研合同的不清晰契约特征与不完全契约性质。

Through the discussion , the paper points out its characteristics of ambiguous contract , and its nature of incomplete contract .

从契约经济学的视角研究组织，我们可以更加深入、准确、全面地对组织现象作出解释。

To study organization in perspective of contractual economics , we can explain organization phenomenon in deeper , more precise and comprehensive way .

本文从契约经济学的角度对虚拟企业成员企业之间的契约关系进行了初步探讨。

This paper offers primary discussion about the contract relationship among the member firms within a virtual organization , in the angle of contract economics .

农地制度作为转型期经济制度的重要内容，其改革思路在理论界存在巨大分歧，本文结合产权理论，从契约经济学的角度对现行农地制度以及农地私有化作出了理论分析。

As a significant part of the economic regime during transition period , the reform of Rural Land System is quite controversial in the academic circle .

本文运用现代企业理论、企业组织和战略管理理论，博弈论、信息经济学、契约经济学与产权经济学等理论知识，采用理论推理和实证检验等多种研究方法，对内部资本市场有效性进行研究。

The paper make use of theoretical knowledge of firm theory , firm organization economics , tactic management theory , contractual economics and theory of ownership , etc.

在对比分析国内外管理学中的激励理论（内容理论和过程理论）和制度/契约经济学的交易费用理论基础上，总结出激励理论一个共同的心理学渊源&快乐/幸福需要原理。

Comparing domestic and international management theory and transaction cost theory , the paper sums up a common source of the motivation theory - - happiness needs principle .

按照契约经济学的分析框架，专用性的资产投资、信息的完备程度是影响契约规制形式的重要因素。

According to the analysis structure of contract economics , the important factors influencing the forms of contract governance include the capital specificity and the level of information maturity .

交易成本经济学和契约经济学在弥补新古典理论缺陷的同时，为考察企业的定义和存在问题提供了一个新的视角，但它并没有给企业的定义与存在提供一个合理的答案。

Cost exchange economics and contract economics provides a new perspective for the definition and existence of enterprise , but it does not give a reasonable solution to the issues .

一直到不完全契约经济学的发展与延伸，现代的财务学者才站在公司治理的角度，将财务控制理论作为一个独立而又重要的财务学分支，重视其制度安排、机制建设和框架构建。

Until the extension and development of Incomplete Contract Economics , Modern financial scholars begin consider financial control as an important and independent branch from the standpoint of corporate governances .

首先，从契约经济学的视角出发，通过博弈模型并运用实证分析法，深入分析了中国股市退市机制失灵的直接原因。

First of all , it starts from the contract economics , with the use of game model and empirical study , it analyzes the direct cause of the dysfunction of delisting mechanism .

委托一代理关系一直是契约经济学研究的重点，莫里斯、霍姆斯特等人已经建立了委托一代理理论的正式模型来分析这种关系。

The principal-agent relationships have been studied as a hot topic in contractual economics . Mirrlees 、 Hollmstrom have already established the formal model of the principal-agent theory to analyze this kind of relations .

本论文应用产权经济学、契约经济学和现代企业理论研究在进行公司破产重组时的产权保护问题以及作为一项重要产权制度的破产重组法律的制订原则。

Based on property economics , contract economics and the modern theory of the firm , this dissertation studies the problem of protecting property rights in corporate reorganization and some rules of corporate reorganization legislation .

契约经济学所论述的代理成本、激励问题、道德风险、逆向选择、搭便车等，在风险投资过程中都会出现。

Those issues discussed in contract economics such as agency cost , incentive problems , moral hazard , adverse selection and free-rider problem , etc. , all appear in the process of venture capital investment .

哈特和霍姆斯特姆曾经表达过对于契约经济学缺乏实证研究的担忧，但最近的情况表明，关于契约理论的实证研究已经越来越多。有大量的研究应用契约理论针对具体问题进行计量经济学验证或进行案例研究。

Hart and Holmstrom expressed the worry about the lack of empirical study of contractual economics . However , the recent study reveals that more and more empirical research have touched the concrete issue by econometrics study .

论文的第二章是将供应链构建和新制度经济学两者结合进行的理论探讨和研究，主要是从资源配置、交易成本和契约经济学三方面来研究供应链的构建。

Combining the Supply Chain Configuration and the New Institutional Economics , the theory inquiry and research is introduced in Chapter 2 , mainly from the angle of resources supplement , transaction cost economics and contract economics .

本文从契约经济学的基本假设与一般界定出发，从契约角度来认识金融工具和证券市场，进而分析证券市场的形成和基本功能。

This thesis attempts to clarify financial instrument and securities market from the perspective of contract , in order to analyze the formation and basic function of securities market by the essential hypothesis and general definition of contract economics .

以契约经济学理论为依据，讨论了物流系统的4种治理模式，即多边治理、三边治理、双边治理和单边治理。

This paper , based on theories of contract economics , discusses four logistics governance models , namely multilateral , trilateral , bilateral and unilateral governances . The applicable prerequisites , advantages and disadvantages of each governance mode are explicitly analysed .