管理舞弊

所以公司管理舞弊的识别被社会广泛关注。

Therefore , management fraud has been widespread concern by public .

管理舞弊控制方面，审计师有自己的职业优势，也存在着职业劣势。

In controlling management fraud , auditors have both professional advantages and disadvantages .

管理舞弊；管理舞弊控制；审计质量；

Management fraud Management fraud control Audit quality ;

首先，政府监管与管理舞弊样本的选择。

First of all , sampling of government supervision and management fraud is structured .

首先介绍了舞弊、管理舞弊的含义，并将管理舞弊与盈余管理进行比较，澄清概念。

It starts with concept of management fraud , then compares management fraud with earnings management .

内外监管不力为管理舞弊提供了机会。

The inside and outside supervision strength has not provided the opportunity for the management fraud .

尽管如此，注册会计师审计仍然被视为公司管理舞弊控制的重要防线。

Nevertheless , auditing by CPA is regarded as an important line of defence against management fraud .

管理舞弊审计策略探析

Tactics on Management Fraud Audit

研究结果表明，企业危机与管理舞弊高度相关。

The results of the study suggest that the correlation between enterprise crisis and management fraud is prominent .

上市公司内部治理机制防范管理舞弊的有效性分析&基于中国证券市场的经验证据

Analysis of the Effectiveness of Internal Governance of Listed Companies for the Prevention of Management Fraud & Evidence from Chinese Security Market

本文重要围绕如何有效提高注册会计师审计管理舞弊效果这一问题展开讨论。

In this paper , it mainly discusses the problem how can the CPA improve the effect of auditing for management fraud .

本文的主要观点及创新之处在于：（1）审计舞弊是管理舞弊实施的重要路径；

The main points and new ideas of the paper are :( 1 ) Audit fraud is an important path to management fraud ;

舞弊诉讼判例反映出一种日渐明显的趋势，即加大了审计师揭示管理舞弊的法律责任。

The ruling of management fraud cases demonstrates an increasingly conspicuous trend , that is , the auditor has increased responsibility to expose management fraud .

摘要注册会计师是否应该对管理舞弊承担相应的审计责任、应负何等程度的责任等问题一直是审计界争论的问题。

Whether CPA should be responsible for management fraud , and what his responsibility should be have been an issue hotly debated in the auditing profession .

基于上述原因，审计理论界和实务界都迫切需要建立管理舞弊审计模式。

Based on reasons mentioned upon , the auditing theoretic group and the auditing practical group both are calling of building a management fraud oriented auditing mode .

实证检验结论说明，从整体上讲，审计师具备识别存在管理舞弊上市公司之间的会计稳健性差异的能力。

The conclusions drawn from positive research sheds light on the fact that auditors recognized the discrepancies in conservatism among listed companies harboring management fraud on the whole .

通过对管理舞弊行为手段研究分析，笔者认为管理舞弊的症结在于公司治理结构的有效性。

According to the analysis of management fraud behavior and means , the writer believes that the reason of management fraud is the validity of corporate governance structure .

针对问题提出防范管理舞弊行为模式，为防范和治理舞弊行为提供理论依据。

In view of the question , it proposed that the guard management fraud behaviors pattern , guard against and governs the corrupting practices behavior and provide the theory basis .

其次，参照这一结论将管理舞弊样本进行分组，检验了管理舞弊识别与审计绩效的相关性。

Then , management fraud sample is been divided into two different groups in light of the first conclusion to test the relationship between management fraud identification and audit performance .

为此，本文提出，风险导向审计应当继续更新审计理念，即引入舞弊推定和心证，以切实提高审计师揭露管理舞弊的能力。

So , we bring forward that risk-oriented audit model should be updated through importing the idea of presumption of fraud and assuredness to improve auditors ability to reveal management fraud .

与此同时，随着财务结构的复杂性和商业竞争的激烈性逐渐加深，管理舞弊行为越来越难以发现，成为严重制约社会经济发展的毒瘤。

Meanwhile , as the complexity of financial structure and the fierceness of competence strengthening , it is difficult to detect management fraud , which has been a malignant tumor restricting our economic development .

本文在借鉴国外较为成熟的舞弊理论及相关研究成果的基础上，采用规范研究的方法对上市公司管理舞弊及舞弊审计相关重要问题作了较为系统的分析研究。

Based on the comparatively mature fraud theory and the correlated research in western countries , this essay studies several important aspects about management fraud and fraud auditing of listed companies by normative approach .

再次，以我国2005-2010年深、沪两市上市公司的经验数据为研究样本，从代理成本和管理舞弊两个方面，实证分析了内部控制对管理者代理问题的影响。

Thirdly , taking our 2005-2010 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies empirical data as study sample , in aspects of agency costs and management fraud , empirically analyze how internal control affects management agency problems .

本论文通过对舞弊三角理论的研究，结合中国特殊的制度背景和上市公司管理舞弊的行为进行分析，并对现行审计模式进行兼收并蓄，构建全新的管理舞弊审计模式。

This study is based on fraud triangle theory and unique institutional context of the Chinese listed companies , and Inclusive of the existing audit mode , constructs a new mode of management fraud auditing .

然而，自18世纪英国南海公司舞弊案催生独立审计以来，因为管理舞弊的广泛存在，审计师与公司管理层之间一直上演着猫捉老鼠的游戏。

However , since 18th century when South Sea Company fraud gave birth to independent auditing , auditors and managements of companies have been play the game of cat and mouse owing to the prevalence of management frauds .

随着安然事件、银广夏事件等一系列管理舞弊案件的爆发，全世界都为之震惊，管理舞弊已经成为财务报表中重大错弊的主要原因。

Enron event , Yin Guang Xia event and other series of management fraud cases have shocked the whole world , therefore , management fraud has become the major reason for the errors and malpractices in the financial statements .

基于审计资源的优化、合理的分配，以及审计技术的提升，审计过程的完善等变化来看，管理舞弊导向审计相对于过去的审计模式，在应对管理舞弊方面，更具有针对性和抑制力。

Based on the optimization and reasonable distribution of audit resources , the improvement of audit techniques and the perfection of audit procedure , management fraud-based auditing is more relevant and inhibited when compared with the past auditing modes .

文章第二章首先从管理舞弊行为及手段研究为切入点，分别对管理舞弊的动因理论、行为、手段及症结进行了分析，引出揭露管理舞弊的迫切性和必要性；

Chapter 2 begins with the study of management fraud behavior and means , analyzes the motivation theory , behavior , means and reason , which indicates that it is hurry and necessary to bring management fraud to light .

由于舞弊又分为管理舞弊和雇员舞弊，从审计人员的角度，管理舞弊是更常见、影响更恶劣，因此，本文将管理舞弊作为研究重点。

Fraud includes employee fraud and management fraud . Since the latter is more common and more abominable , the paper puts stress on it . But the fraudulent financial reporting can be divided into the management fraud and the employee fraud .

实证结论发现：第一，非标准意见与上市公司的管理舞弊行为具有显著正相关关系，即被出具非标准意见的上市公司具有管理舞弊行为的可能性越大。

Empirical findings found that : First , the non-standard views on the management of listed companies engaged in corrupt conduct with a significant positive correlation between , he incurs non-standard opinion issued by a listed company to administer the greater the possibility of fraud .