青木昌彦

青木昌彦的比较制度分析研究

The Research of Masahiko Aoki 's Comparative Institutional Analysis

利用青木昌彦的相机治理结构模型分析得出，政府对国有企业这一相机治理机制是不成功的。

By analyzing Aoki 's model , this paper concludes that such a mechanism is ineffective because of the asymmetric information between government and insiders .

如何转化按照是否有第三者介入分为两种情况，分别引入了青木昌彦的银行辛迪加方案和哈特的AHM程序，并简要阐述了作者对这两种方式的看法。

The scheme of bank syndicate and AHM procedure explain transitional process .

在对青木昌彦的比较制度分析思想作了全面的回顾后，本文将这一新的经济学理论和新古典经济学、新制度经济学进行了比较研究，做出了相应的理论评价。

Based on the review of the theory , we compare it with neo-classical and new institutional economics .

并借用青木昌彦的关系附随治理模型，以集团公司为切入点，建立了财务治理权在电力企业中的动态配置模式。

On the relational-contingent for reference , we create a new dynamic mode for the disposition of financial right in the electric power enterprises .

早在1995年，青木昌彦等世界银行专家就断言：公司治理将成为企业改革的中心议题。

Back to 1995 , World Bank experts such as Aoki had asserted that the corporate governance structure should be a central topic for corporate reforming .

其四，青木昌彦和扬提出了制度的多种均衡问题，并通过主观博弈模型和随机稳定策略分别论证了不同文化背景下制度出现多样性的可能性。

Fourthly , Okazaki and Young put forward the problem of multi-equilibrium of institution , and expounded respectively the probability of institutional multiplicity e-merged in different cultural background through subjective game model and random strategy of stability .