所有者缺位

MBO在我国不仅是改变公司股权结构的一种重组行为，也为解决我国国有企业所有者缺位及国有资本从竞争性行业逐渐退出提供了一条有效途径。

In our country MBO not only change ownership structure of a restructuring behavior , but also solve our state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital owner absence from competitive industry gradually withdraw provides an efficient way .

在我国，MBO公司法上的价值取向从传统的减低代理成本逐渐本土化为解决国有股所有者缺位问题。

In our country , MBO 's value orientations in company law has changed from a traditional one that lowering the cost of agent to solving the problem state-owned stock lack of owner location gradually .

所有者缺位论质疑

Query on the Theory of the Owners ' Vacant Position

对民族文化旅游资源产权制度中所有者缺位现象的探讨

Discussion on the Proprietor Absence of the Ethnic Culture Tourism Resources Property Right System

国有资产管理中所有者缺位问题研究

On Owners ' Absence of State Property

该问题深层次的矛盾在于国企与生俱来的先天所有者缺位问题。

Of the problem is deep-seated contradictions inherent in state-owned congenital absence owner of the problem .

通过国有企业民营化解决所有者缺位问题；

Through the way of " state-owned enterprise privatization ", solve the problem of " enterprise owner absence ";

其主原因有所有者缺位、信息不对称、制衡机制弱化等。

The main reasons include the vacancy of owners , the asymmetric information and the weakening of balance mechanism .

第二章对国有独资公司治理结构中的非独立治理、内部人控制及所有者缺位的问题进行了分析。

The second chapter analyzes the problems of nonindependent governance , insider control and owner absence in the governance structure of solely state-owned company .

派生诉讼是现代公司法提供给小股东用以纠正所有者缺位导致董事职权过大以及资本多数决原则下的大股东独权的救济手段。

It is a remedy under modern corporate law to redress the problem of absence of the proprietor or the abuse of the majority rule .

实质上，我国国有企业在制度上的根本缺陷不是所有者缺位，而是存在国企所有权的缺位构造格局。

The essential institutional defect of our state - owned enterprises is structure of vacant position of state ownership , instead of the owners ' vacant position .

导致国有股比例和股权集中度没有起到应有作用的原因是由于垄断性企业存在严重的所有者缺位和政府监管不力。

The Cause that the proportion of state-owned shares and ownership concentration does not play its due role is the serious absence of monopoly owner and government supervision .

所有者缺位、股权结构不合理、董事会功能异化、公司控制权缺乏威胁和外部监督的弱势是内部人控制问题的成因。

It comes from the owner absence , unreasonable structure of shares holders , lack of role of directorate , weak controlling of the companies and outside supervising .

但是我国上市公司一股独大的集中型股权结构、所有者缺位以及内部人（控股股东和公司高管）控制的特征在短时期内仍然无法改变。

However , the features of listed companies still does not change such as , the concentrated ownership structure , the owner absence and insiders control in the short term .

国有控股在国有上市公司的主体地位，又往往会导致所有者缺位从而使国有企业的实际控制权转移至管理层。

And State-owned holding the dominant position of state-owned listed companies often lead to the absence of owners , so that state-owned enterprises whose control is transferred to the management .

分析了我国国有资产管理体制中存在的所有者缺位问题，借鉴发达国家的改革经验，对如何解决这一问题做了初步探讨，指出了解决这一问题过程中需注意的三要点。

By analyzing the problem of owners ' absence in state property management , based on the experience of developed countries , some solutions are put forward to do with it .

最后，就所有者缺位的问题阐述了我国国有资产监督管理委员会的设立原因、模式及性质。

Finally , being aimed at the problem of owner absence , it elaborates the establishment reason , model and character of the state-owned assets supervision and management committee in our country .

会计委派制作为其解决途径之一，较好的解决了“所有者缺位”的问题，强化了会计的监管作用。

The accountancy appointment system , as one of the solutions concerned , will better solve the problem of " lack of the proprietor ", and enhance the regulating function of accountancy .

会计信息故意失真产生的原因在于所有者缺位造成的监管失控、政治和经济利益的驱动以及会计法规制度不健全。

Its causes lie in the being out of supervision control due to the absence of owners , the drive of political and economic interests , and the imperfect accountant regulation system .

国有企业产权改革的根本在于解决所有者缺位问题，并加强法律和道德约束，建立监督约束机制，使国有资产保值、增值。

The reform of state-owned enterprise property right lies in solving the problem of owners out of position , strengthening the restriction of law and morality and establishing the mechanism of supervision and restriction .

产权不清、所有者缺位、内控制度不严、激励和约束机制不健全，造成了巨额的不良贷款，成了银行沉重的包袱。

Property right problems , absence of owner , lenient inner control system and the incompleteness of the incentive and discipline mechanism have caused gigantic bad assets , a heavy burden for the banks .

从委托代理制和所有者缺位现象进行分析，国有企业经营者激励与约束不仅重要，而且具有特殊意义。

It is of great importance and of special meaning of stimulus and regulating mechanism of operators for state-owned enterprises from analysis of trustee-beneficiary system and the phenomena of ' vacancy of owner ' .

同时我国的国有独资公司也一直被所有者缺位、政企不分、经营者缺乏有效监督等问题所困扰，多年来理论、实践上的探索虽有成就，但仍未能取得良好的效果。

At the same time , wholly state-owned company having been puzzled by the trouble , such as absence of proprietor , confusion of government with enterprise , and shortage of effective supervision to operator .

就实践层面而言，建立法人治理结构可望较好地解决目前事业单位管理体制中存在的管办不分、所有者缺位、内部人控制、监管薄弱等突出问题。

Also , corporate governance of institutions is expected to effectively solve the current problems involved with the management system of institutions including non-separation of regulation from operation , owner absence , insider control and slack supervision .

人们一方面认为国有上市公司所有者缺位，另一方面又指责上市公司大股东对中小股东价值的侵占行为。

On the one hand , people realize the vacancy of the owner of the national listed company , on the other hand , they criticize the inference of the big shareholders to the medium and small ones .

国企低效率的根本原因与其说是所有者缺位，不如说是国有产权残缺，也就是国有财产的收益权与控制权严重地不对称甚或分离。

The root cause for the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises is not the absence of real owners but the truncated property rights , namely the asymmetric relationship between the right to benefit from and the right to control .

转型国家国有企业所有者缺位与内部人控制的匹配以及中国企业股权融资偏好、银行信贷融资偏好与关键人控制的匹配。

The matching of the proprietor vacancy and internal person control in the state-owned corporate of the transformational country and the matching of Chinese corporate equity financing preference , bank credit financing preference and key person control . Thirdly .

通过研究，我们认为国有商业银行的产权制度安排是国有商业银行问题的症结所在，公有产权的性质直接导致了所有者缺位的问题。

By the study , we find that the nature of the public property directly lead to the problem of empty ownership , then we think the property system of the state-owned commercial banks is the crux of the problem .

通过适当分散股权，形成股东之间的制衡机制，减少上市公司的非理性行为；通过国有股东的人格化改变所有者缺位现象。

In order to reduce the irrational behavior of listed companies should be formation of checks and balances between the shareholders by through appropriate distributed equity . And through personified of state-owned shareholders change the phenomenon that the absence of owners .

由于国有产权的多重代理体制，国有企业出现所有者缺位的现象，最终形成内部人控制，企业的管理者可能会通过非市场化的方式把获取的大量超额利润转化为内部人收益。

As multi-agent system of state-owned property , the state-owned enterprises have " absence of owners " phenomenon , formation of inside control ultimately . Corporate managers may be through non-market-oriented approach to a large number of excess profits into insider gains .