激励性合同

独立发电商与电力公司之间的激励性可中断供电合同模型

A Model for Incentive Interruptible Power Supply Contracts between Independent Power Generation Companies and Utility

因此，激励性可中断负荷合同不仅能提高用户需求弹性，还有助于供电公司回避市场风险。

Therefore , incentive interruptible load contracts not only can improve customers ? demand elasticity , but also can help distribution companies to avoid market risk .

简要说明了电力市场中应用激励性机制设计理论的意义和一般方法，着重介绍和分析了有关激励性发电上网竞价机制及激励性双边合同设计的应用研究。

The significance and the general method to apply the incentive mechanism design theory to electricity markets are briefly described . Research works related to incentive mechanism design for power generation bidding and bilateral contracting are emphatically presented and analyzed .